THE PROBABLE OR THE NATURAL CONSEQUENCE AS THE TEST OF LIABILITY
IN NEGLIGENCE.
The cases decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
seem to indicate in a cursory reading that the measure of
damages in actions of negligence differs from that in other
torts.
The usual test of a negligent wrongdoer's liability for the
results of his wrong in these cases is that announced by Paxson, J., in Hoag v. R. R. :1"The injury must be the natural
consequence of the negligence-such a consequence as under
the surrounding circumstances of the case might and ought
to have been foreseen by the wrongdoer as likely to flow
from his act."
This of itself would indicate that in such cases the wrongdoer's responsibility for the consequences of his act was to be
restricted to his reasonable anticipations.
This is more nearly the measure of damages in contract
than in torts other than negligence. In such torts the
wrongdoer must answer for all the natural consequences of
his wrong until the chain of cause and effect be broken by
the intervention of some new, outside, independent force
breaking" the chain and diverting the consequences to some
new and different end. "An efficient adequate cause being
found must be considered the true cause, unless some other
cause, not incident to it, but independent of it, is shown to
have intervened between it and the result: Dixon, C. J.,
Kellogg v. R. R.2
The obligation is one imposed by law upon all members
of the community, in order to protect their fellow-members
from the injurious consequence of acts prohibited, because
they invade some absolute right, or are of a class which
usually causes damage to the person or property of such
fellow-members. They in return receive similar protection
from the usually injurious acts of others. Where such a
"85 Pa. 293 (298).
'26 Wis. 223.
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rule of "conduct established by public policy for the good of
all is violated, the wrongdoer should answer for all the consequence brought about by the working out of the injurious
tendency of his wrongful act until the ordinary natural laws
of cause and effect are diverted by some outside agency.
The duty is imposed for the protection of the inherent common-law rights of the individuals forming the community;
it is enforceable by a right of action, given not to the state
to punish the wrongdoer, but to the injured party to recover
for himself compensation for the loss resulting from the
wrong. The question is not what should the defendant pay,
but what should the plaintiff receive. It may be hard to
mulct the wrongdoer in damages for results which the normal man would not anticipate, but it is more unjust that the
person injured by the breach of a duty imposed for his protection should not recover for all the loss which has in
ordinary course of nature been caused to him by the wrong,
because the wrongdoer could not foresee the full effect of his
act. Malice or evil motive may enhance the verdict by the
recovery of punitive damages imposed as a punishment to
the wrongdoer and a deterrent to others, although the principle is anomalous, but the loss to the plaintiff is as great,
his right to recover should be as certain, if the loss be a
natural result of the wrong, whether the defendant intended
the whole damage to result or should have known it would
occur, or could not possibly foresee the extent of the consequences of his act.
In contract, on the contrary, the rule is that a party can
only recover for such injuries as usually, normally, customarily, are the result of the breach, or such as are rendered probable by reason of exceptional circumstances
known to both parties, and in reference to whose existence
the contract was made.
In contract no duty common to all is broken, no inherent
right invaded; the obligation is self-assumed, the right selfcreated: they are obligations and rights created by the mutual
consent of the parties in addition to those imposed or given
by the policy of the law as necessary for the protection of
all citizens generally. So there is no reason why the liability for a breach of such a duty, the invasion of such a
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right, should be extended beyond those consequences normally and usually probable under the circumstances as known
to both. If a party desire a fuller right of recovery than
such usual consequences, he can either expressly stipulate
for them, or can by calling to the other parties' attention
any special facts rendering such results probable, make him
liable for them. His destiny is in his own hands. He can
increase by a word his obligation or his rights; he is entitled
to no more than a reasonable man would anticipate obtaining; he assumes no obligations, either for performance or
for compensation for non-performance, in addition to those
normally probable according to the facts within his knowledge. How can a man be said to assume voluntarily a responsibility for what he could not have contemplated as likely
to occur?
Certainty is the great desideratum in the law of
contract. Parties to a contract must know what they are
bound to do to make a good performance or to compensate
'1for a bad; what they are entitled to receive either in performance or upon breach. Justice in individual cases must
yield to this necessity of certainty.
Then, too, either the plaintiff never contemplated
so remote a result as probable, and never intended or expected to acquire any right in respect to it, or knowing circumstances making such result probable, he did not disclose
them ,when notice would have given the right of recovery,
to the defendant, either from carelessness or from a fear
that the defendant would not be willing to assume so wide
a possible liability for the consideration given.
True it is, as has been said, a party contemplates the performance and not the breach of a contract,3 but none the
less a man would consider the extent of his possible liability
for a breach which may be caused by some necessity, sorely
against his will, as a very decisive factor in favor of or
against his entering into a contract. The voluntary nature
of both obligation and right, the necessity of encouraging
business by imposing no liability, so wide as to frighten
merchants from entering into contracts; the possibility of
either party obtaining, with the other's consent, an indefinite
Ehrgott v. N. Y., 96 N. Y. 264.
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extension of the liability for breach of all these things; the
inadvisability of their obtaining such an extension without
such consent, emphasize the propriety of a rule of damages
in contract cases which would be totally inappropriate in
action of tort.
Is there, then, in the nature of the duty to avoid injuring
one's neighbor by negligence, any analogy to contractual
obligation, anything foreign to the duty enforceable in all
other actions of tort? Surely not; it is an obligation not
assumed or created by the parties. True, no obligation arises
until the party acts; but the duty is imposed upon him when
he acts irrespective of any consent; it is a restraint placed
upon his action when his acting has a probable tendency to
injure his fellows. His action places him in a certain relation (it may even be one created by contract) to his fellowcitizens-to that relation the law attaches the duty of care.
Can any distinction be drawn between malicious, willful
wrongs and those where intent is absent, which will justify
different measure of damage in the two cases? It is true that
tortious acts may be divided into those which are actionable:
(i)

without proof of special damage; (2) only upon such

proof-the first being cases where some absolute right has
been infringed, such as the right to the inviolable sanctity of
one's person or property, the others being those acts forbidden because usually attended by probability of injury to
the person or property of others.
In the first case, the duty is absolute to refrain from invading such sacred rights; in the second, no act is wrongful,
unless the probability of injury to some determinate person
or class of persons raises the duty as to those persons to
refrain from such act, and no action can be brought
until the probability of injury has culminated in damage
actually sustained in consequence of the act.
In the first class of cases, the injury is generally intentional, though not always necessarily so; in the second, it
is usually not intentional or willful. In neither is intention
essential. In the first, it is the sanctity of the right which
raises the duty to respect it; in the second, the probability of
injury renders the act wrongful. If in the second class of
cases a person intends injury to follow his act, as to him, the
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injury is of course the probable result, though the average
normal man would not regard it as such. In such a case as
in cases of the first class there is no need to consider the reasonably probable effects of the act in order to raise the
duty-the duty is clear, the violation absolute; all that remains is to apply the measure of damages so as to compensate the person injured for the loss he has sustained as
the legally proximate (that is the natural) consequences of
the admittedly wrongful act. This, however, is not the normal case of this class, and the very term negligence negatives the possibility of intentional wrong in negligence cases.
The law of negligence does not attempt to lay down or
define any set definite standard of conduct applicable to all
the affairs of mankind. It is in its very nature a compromise whereby the safety of the persons and property of
the members of the body politic are to be guarded, as far as
may be, without hampering unduly the transaction of business and the freedom of individual action.
The test is 4 the conduct of the average reasonable mannot the ideal citizen, but the normal one.
So no one is bound to conduct his business with any
regard to those who can be only possibly affected by the
manner in which he carries it on; he owes a duty of care to
those only whom the normal man should foresee that his
lack of care might injure.5
Nor is any one bound, even as to such as may probably be
affected by his acts, to take precautions to guard against
every possible contingency; the standard of care to which he
must conform is to take such, and only such, precautions as
' Sometimes modified in practice by the necessities of the encourage-.
ment of enterprise beneficial to the community without however announcing any departure from the general theory.
"While this is true, the converse of the proposition is not.
The
probability of injury from carelessness does not in every case raise the
obligation to be careful. Heaven v. Pender, L. R., ii Q. B. D. 503,
opinion of majority of court. Brett, M. R., dissents. Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 7o. It would seem that he who makes or supplies a chattel
or real property divests himself of responsibility for its condition when
he parts with the possession, control and use. The retention of any
of these, however, continues the duty. Elliott v. Hall, L. R., is
Q. B. D. 315; Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. iii.
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are reasonably sufficient to guard against those damages
which may be anticipated as probably resulting from his
actions.
If the position in which the defendant is situated as regards the plaintiff raises the duty of care, if the probabilities of the case demand the exercise of a certain measure of
care, and that care be not taken, then the defendant, if his
default has caused injury, must answer for the plaintiff's
loss sustained as a legal consequence. Shall he, because the
existence of the duty, the failure to take the required care,
which is the fact of his wrongdoing, is to be measured and
decided according to the reasonable anticipations of the normal man, restrict also his liability for the effects of an act
now shown to be wrongful by the application of the same
standard?
Reason, justice and authority" alike answer this question
in the negative. The rule in England is best expressed by
Blackburn, J., in Smith v. R. R. 7 bottom of page 21:
"If negligence be once established it would be no answer
to say it did much more damage than was expected"; and
again: "What a person may reasonably anticipate is important in considering whether he has been negligent."
In Sharp v. Powell,8 a plaintiff was properly nonsuited because it was shown that the defendant could not
have foreseen that his act, though a breach of a city ordinance, would probably affect the plaintiff in any way; he
had violated a city ordinance, 9 but no duty owed to the
plaintiff; while in Clark v. Chambers,:" the act being admittedly wrongful toward the plaintiff, he was allowed to recover, though the wrong took effect in injury in a manner
exceedingly difficult for any man to have foreseen. 1 In
'England,

Clark v. Chambers, L. R., 3 Q. B. D.

330;

Blackburn, 3.,

Smith v. R. R., L. R., 6 C. P. 14 bot. of p. 2i; Federal Courts, Kellogg v.
R.. R., 94 U. S. 469; New York, Ehrgott v. N. Y., 96 N. Y. 264; Mass.,
Hill v. Winsor, niS Mass. 251; Wis., Kellogg v. R. R., 26 Wis. 223.
T

L. R., 6 C. P.

14.

SL. R., 7 C. P. 253.

'As in Fairbanks v. Kerr,
10L. R., 3 Q. B. D. 330.

infra.

"See Mr. Bevan's admirable treatise on Negligence. He it is who
first drew attention to the different rule of cause and effect applicable
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Ehrgott v. N. Y., 1 2 the defendant's counsel advanced the
rule in Hoag v. R. R. in almost exact words, but it was rejected by the court as a test where the city was proven to be
in default. C. J. Dixon's statement of the Wisconsin rule in
Kellogg v. R. R.:3 is quoted supra.
In Hill v. Winsor,'4 Colt, J., thus states the Massachusetts rule: "This" (that defendant ran into a wharf, when
he might have foreseen injury in some form to the plaintiff
therefrom) "constitutes negligence, and it is not necessary
that the injury in the precise form should have been foreseen. It is enough that it now appears to have been the
natural and probable. consequence."5 The line is drawn
sharply between foresight and "hindsight." The existence
of negligence is determined by the probabilities ascertainable
at the time-the probabilities after the event settle how
far the liability for it extends. Is it not a contradiction
in terms to say that a thing so improbable that it could not.
be reasonably foreseen may become probable afterwards,
because it does occur? It is natural, if it occurred in the
ordinary course of nature, animate and inanimate, but it is
not probable, unless it could have in advance been predicted
as likely to occur.
It would seem that this practically amounts to a statement
that the existence of the duty, the measure of care, in a word,
the fact of negligence, is to be judged by the standard of the
reasonable anticipation of the normal man as it appeared
to him when he acted, the liability for such negligence
by the test of the natural consequence of his wrong.
The jury must look at the circumstances existing to the
defendant's knowledge, to see whether he should have expected the probability of injury to the plaintiff by reason
of the act or omission alleged to be negligent. Once having
to the existence of negligence and the liability for the consequences
thereof, between probable and natural consequences.
" 96 N. Y. 264.
Wis. 223.
1 8IIMass. 251.

1"2

Practically the same view is taken by Sir Frederick Pollock in his
valuable treatise on the Law of Torts: "The kind of harm which in fact
happened might have been expected, though the precise manner in
which it happened was determined by an extraneous accident." P. 45.
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determined this, they are to look, not at the facts as they
then existed, but at what has since happened, and then to
say whether the injury complained of was natural or exceptional, the result of the orderly working out unassisted
of the injurious tendencies of the wrong, or whether it was
the effect of some outside force which has utilized the conditions created by the wrong, but has utilized them to bring
about some new and different result.
In a word, to determine the fact of negligence, reasonable probability of injury is the test; to determine the extent of liability-it is the unbroken chain of natural cause
and effect. To recapitulate: To constitute actionable negligence there must be: (i) A duty to the plaintiff to observe
care. This depends upon the probability of injury if care
be not taken. (2) A standard of care not observed (constituting the breach). This'again depends upon the anticipation of probable danger. (3) Injury suffered in consequence.
This, it is submitted, must be judged by the rules governing
responsibility for the effect of a breach of any obligation
imposed by law and not assumed voluntarily by the parties.' 6
Now, in reading negligence cases it is necessary to remember that if the plaintiff fails in establishing any one
of these elements he must lose.
If he fails to offer evidence capable of sustaining an inference in his favor as to any one of them he is non-suited;
and it will be found that in the decisions these three elements are not properly distinguished and separated; they
are grouped, as it were-if the evidence fails to support
any of the three, it is simply stated that there is not sufficient
evidence of negligence legally the cause of the injury complained of.
So a rule proper as to the existence of the duty, or the
"The relation out of which the duty springs, to which the law attaches the obligation because of the probability of injury, may be created
by a contract voluntarily entered into; but it is the law which imposes
the obligation, not the parties who create it. A person buys a railroad
ticket (a contract by the company to carry him) ; he thereby becomes a
passenger for hire when he entered the train-the duty to carry' safely
then attaches to the relation of carrier and passenger, and is an obligation imposed by law, and of extraordinary stringency because of the
ultra-hazardous nature of the business.

THE TEST OF LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE.

measure of care, is often applied as the test for the extent
of the liability, but in such case with additions or qualifications which, while practically conforming to the ordinary
measure of damages, in other classes of torts, destroys its
value as a test for determining those questions; to which
alone it should be applied.
In Haverly v. R. R.,17 Mitchell, J., alludes to a most potent source of confusion in the Pennsylvania cases, i. e., that
in nearly similar cases "different results are reached not
(depending on) any different view of the law, but of the
facts, and on the application of the familiar doctrine that
where a plain inference is to be drawn from undisputed facts,
the court will decide it as matter of law."
The court does not, however, decide it by the application
of fixed legal standards capable of definite enunciation, 18 but
by the exercise of their ordinary knowledge, reasoning, and,
above all, common sense, just as the jury, when the facts
are disputed, upon finding the facts, by the same process,
draw such further inferences. In truth it is not a matter
of law at all, nor decided as such, no matter who decides it;
it is pure matter of fact, ascertainable by the ordinary powers of the ordinary man, and as such, by whomsoever decided, liable to the same errors and inconsistencies. In other
jurisdictions, even where the primary physical facts are undisputed, such inferences of fact, the existence of a duty,
the standard of care required, and the casual connection
between the wrong and the injury, are left to the jury, not
merely where the inference is not "plain," but wherever more
than one inference could reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Where there is evidence from which the jury might
draw one of two inferences, even though the judge thinks
one much the better, it is for them to say which they shall
draw. If the evidence is such that only one inference can
fairly be drawn by any process of reasoning, so that a contrary finding would be mere guesswork, the result of
27

135

Pa. 5o (58).

' Without a proposition or rule which can be enunciated or predicated,

there can be no rule of law; a rule of law can always be predicated in
terms. Brett, J. (afterwards Lord Esher), Bridges v. R. R., L. R., 7
E. and F. App. 213, p. 233.
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prejudice, the case is not allowed to go to the jury, but is
decided by the court in accordance with the only sole permissible inference.
Whether the evidence is patient of two inferences is
itself a preliminary question of fact for the court; if it be
not, it is a rule of law that the case must be withdrawn from

the jury.
If, in Mr. Justice Mitchell's statement, a "plain inference"
means one which the court strongly thinks should be drawn,
the rule encroaches dangerously on the province of the jury;
if it means that it is the only permissible inference, it has
often been disregarded by the Pennsylvania courts, higher
and lower alike. This article is concerned with ascertaining, if possible, what rules of law have been applied as tests
in certain classes of cases, not with criticising and reconciling all decisions of the court upon matters of fact with all
those inconsistencies and vagaries inherent in the decision of
such questions.
Often the court has held as so-called "matter of law" that
certain things do or do not constitute an independent intervening agent, or that under certain circumstances a reasonable man would or would not expect certain consequences
of his act. Decisions on such points are vital to the parties
and interesting to the profession as indicative of the court's
probable opinion in future similar matters of fact; but it is
the effect ascribed to the existence or non-existence of such
intervening cause or reasonable expectation, when ascertained, which establish the rule of law, the standard and test
of duty and liability.
Francis H. Bohien.
[To be continued.]

